Sderot and Questioning of "Operational Success"

The trip to Sderot on July 12^th was of particular interest for me. The ability to be so close to what can be correctly described as an “active border” was absolutely fascinating. As was explained, any minute members of terrorist organizations may try to infiltrate through the border or launch rocket and mortar attacks into the State of Israel. This constant threat is unique as no where else in the world does there exist as great of threat with actual attacks perpetrated. It also puts into context the daily security challenges facing not only the city of Sderot but also the majority of the country with Hamas and other Islamist groups acquiring sophisticated launch capabilities over the years from allies, such as the Fajr family of missiles from Iran. How a community can live in such close proximity to Gaza is, at least in the American experience, unfathomable. While I was quite in awe by what I saw, it was what I learned while in the town that truly stuck with me and brought multiple questions to mind.

            As we toured around the town and eventually the hill overlooking the border, I began to think greatly about my paper topic on the evolution of Israel’s military operations, but more importantly about the conference in Herzliya. At the conference it was deemed by a majority of the panel that the operation conducted in November was a success and that deterrence had been reestablished in relation to Hamas. Yet Kobe Haroosh, Head of Security for Sderot, stated that after the operation and the chaos ensuing in Egypt massive amounts of arms and explosives have crossed the border and have filled the weapons caches of Hamas and other groups. Thus right now Hamas and other groups are as heavily armed with more sophisticated weaponry. How can it be that  This then brings into question the method in which those at the conference believe to be a success. If it is the belief that success is short-term reestablishment of deterrence and destroying the existing stockpiles of long-range rockets, then yes the operation can be deemed as a success. But if we take the more pragmatic idea that success if to achieve long-term goals, in the case with Gaza limiting Hamas’ deadly potential, then it is obvious Operation “Pillar of Cloud” failed. The idea of deterrence also made me question the “Iron Dome” missile system as in the case of Sderot and many communities bordering the Gaza Strip do not get the protection of the system. Therefore Hamas may carry out its operations unabated, instilling fear and inflicting both physical and mental harm on Israeli citizens. The experience has began to make me question more what success truly means in an operation, and is a strong counterpoint to the idea that as a result of moving to a different method in which the IDF conducts asymmetric conflict, the result is not any more effective in attaining the goals set at the onset of the mission.