Amanda Kruzel: Blog #4

             For me, one of the most fascinating readings from the program was the Hamas Covenant of 1988. Not only did it explain Hamas’s radical position on the state of Israel, it also revealed the extraordinarily narrow interpretations of Islam held by this group. I found the text to be highly problematic in many ways.

Of course, I find the call for the destruction of Israel to be absurd. In my mind, the ridiculous nature of this appeal can be taken for granted and I do not believe it necessary to write further about this.

However, I would like to write on a few critiques I have on specific elements of the charter.

First of all, I see the violent and militaristic nature of Hamas as horrendous. As a shameless peacenik/pacifist/Gandhi lover, I find violence to be a move comparable to shooting oneself in the foot. In the long term, I believe it is a terrible policy in terms of bringing about positive change in society. As Macbeth says, “blood will have blood.” Yes, there are problems with Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza. Yes, there are problems with Israeli policies concerning Arabs in Israel proper. But as one of my classmates said when we were discussing the charter, “Come on, grow up Hamas.” Rather than calling for (a highly controversial definition of) jihad and the destruction of Israel, it seems to me that a more productive stance would be to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the current situation, and assume a less militaristic platform.

Secondly, I would like to focus on the interaction between Islam and politics in this specific context. Clearly, Islam (or at least Hamas’s perception of Islam) is at the heart of the charter. I found the near-incessant quoting of the Qur’an to be absolutely fascinating! The religious citations, references, and evocations of the protection of God took up nearly half of the charter!

            From what I’ve found in classes about Islamic politics, Islam (like other religions) often becomes a more salient power when it is partnered with politics. Used as a common unifier of Muslims, it can be harnessed as a large and powerful force to create change in society. Therefore, I think one might contend that some central tenets of the Hamas charter, such as jihadist violence and resistance against Jews, is not a component of Islam, but rather, a political argument made in light of a specific situation at hand.

            In looking at Islam in a political framework, it is interesting to note that the religion is often used as a unifying force against what the umma see as an injustice. For example, Professor Ayoob argues that it has often been utilized as a force against imperialistic projects that have denied Muslims the right to self-determination, such as occupiers like as Britain, France, and the United States. Of course, in some ways, Hamas views Israel as a colonial power, rejecting the idea that Jews are entitled access to their historic homeland, believing that any success for Zionists was made at the expense of the Arabs.

Yet, if Hamas’s underlying purpose is fighting what it considers to be the injustice of a colonial occupier, I find the text to be inherently contradictory. Indeed, the fast-paced Islamic expansion in the years after Muhammad’s death (705-715 CE) was itself of an imperialistic nature!

This contradiction can be seen in light of the fact that Hamas sees Islam as the most perfect (indeed, ultimate) faith. The charter says, “This belief is made evident in other areas throughout the text as well. One example of this concept is the prevalent belief that Muslims are the best employers of religious freedoms throughout the world, and throughout history as well. As the charter states, “Under the wing of Islam, it is possible for the followers of the three religions – Islam, Christianity, and Judaism to coexist in peace and quiet with each other… it is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the sovereignty of Islam in this region, because the day these followers take over there will be nothing but carnage, displacement and terror” (237). Of course, this was not always true. While the dhimmi were often treated well compared to other places in the world at the time, they were also often persecuted badly in other realms of Islam throughout its history.

This somewhat simplistic view of Islam as a perfect religion displays the more black-and-white approach that Hamas shows toward history, politics, and ideologies. This can especially be contrasted with the role of Fatah, which has played a more moderate role in recent years. Yet, as some might argue, Hamas is beginning to display moderation as well. Maybe it would not be a bad thing for the Israeli government to start private negotiations with Hamas’s more moderate leaders, encouraging the development of pragmatism in Palestinian right-wing leadership, rather than continuing to reject talks, which might lead to the further radicalization of the Hamas leadership.